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AN ESSAY ON THE NEED FOR SUBSIDIZED,
MANDATORY LONG-TERM CARE INSURANCEt
LAWRENCE A. FROLIK*
Imagine yourself in a room with 100 persons, all age sixty.
Of the group, fifty-three are women and forty-seven are men.
Racially and ethnically they mirror the population of Americans
age sixty. Now answer the question: "Before the 100 die, how
many will require long-term care and, on the average, for how
many days and at what cost?" Give up? So do I. While it is com-
mon knowledge that many of us will need long-term care, no one
seems to know how many will need such care or for how long.1
And some of you will ask, "What do you mean by 'long-term
care?"' Here again, there is no consistent answer.2 Certainly,
care provided in a nursing home and probably in an assisted liv-
ing facility qualifies as long-term care, but are all residents of
board and care homes receiving long-term care? And what of
those receiving assistance from a spouse? How much assistance is
needed to be considered long-term care? What of the elderly
who live with a child or a relative? Surely some do so because of
the need for care, but not all. We have no knowledge of how
many elderly who live with another do so primarily to receive
assistance or care. Other elderly live alone and contract for care
in their home, but here too we have no idea of the number.
Other forms of care may or may not qualify as providing long-
term care. For example, is adult day care long-term care? Are
the elderly who spend some or all of the day at a senior services
t On November 9, 2006, the Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public
Policy hosted a symposium entitled "Long-Term Care for America's Elderly:
Who Is Responsible, and How Will It Be Achieved?". Professor Frolik was the
third speaker at the Symposium. His remarks have been revised for
publication.
* Lawrence A. Frolik, Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh School
of Law. University of Nebraska (B.A. 1966); Harvard Law School (J.D. 1969,
LL.M. 1972).
1. While there are data as to nursing home rates of occupancy, many eld-
erly receive long-term care at home, in assisted living facilities and in board and
care homes. We have no national statistics that compile the number of individ-
uals receiving long-term care, in part because we have no consistent definition
of what is "long-term care."
2. See, e.g., JOHN C. CAVANAUGH & SusAN KRAuss WHITBOURNE, GERONTOL-
OGY: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECrIVE 433 (1999) (describing different situa-
tions that could be considered long-term care).
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center recipients of long-term care or just lonely individuals in
search of companionship and a good meal?
Because of the lack of information as to the current need for
long-term care, we just do not know what the probability is of
today's sixty year-olds needing long-term care. Even our sketchy
idea of how many elderly are presently receiving long-term care
tells very little of the prospects of today's sixty year-olds requiring
long-term care. We do know that the age at which individuals
require long-term care is growing older, so that the onset of the
need for long-term care is delayed until later years.' But we do
not know if that translates into a shorter period of long-term care
or whether it just means that where formerly the average age of
long-term care recipients was age eighty and the length of care
was eighteen months, on the average today's sixty year-olds will
not need long-term care until age eighty-eight, but the average
length of care may be longer than eighteen months. If our sixty
year-olds do receive long-term care, it may or may not cost as
much as the care provided today's recipients. For example, if the
use of nursing homes declines in favor of receiving long-term
care in assisted living facilities, the savings could be considerable.
Or we might face an epidemic of diabetes, which might cause a
sharp rise in both the number of individuals needing long-term
care and the cost of that care. In short, we have no sure answer
to at what age and for how long today's sixty year-olds will need
long-term care.
What of the question, "What is long-term care?" Interest-
ingly there is at least one source for an answer-long-term care
insurance policies provide a definition as a means of defining
when an individual has the need for long-term care and so trig-
gers the payment of benefits under the policy.4 Still, equating
long-term care with what an insurance company considers "long-
term care" for purposes of paying benefits has some obvious
drawbacks. The most apparent is that an insurer might limit the
definition of long-term care in order to minimize benefit pay-
ments. True, but still, at least insurance companies have a defini-
tion and, more importantly, it works in the sense that the policy
definition does provide a reasonably bright line test for when an
individual qualifies for "long-term care" benefits. The policy def-
inition distinguishes long-term care from other kinds of care
such as acute or merely personal, elective care. It does so not by
focusing on the type of care, but the nature of the need for care.
3. WILLIAM C. CocKERH"A, THIS AGING SOCIETY 29 (2d ed. 1997).
4. ABA, LEGAL GUIDE FOR AMERICANS OVER 50, at 188 (2006).
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Typically, long-term care insurance benefits are paid when
the insured has a medical condition that necessitates long-term
care (certified by a physician), a cognitive deficit that necessitates
supervision or custodial care (most commonly some kind of
dementia), or when the insured cannot perform two of the activi-
ties of daily living.5 While these definitions can be seen as a bit
too restrictive-for example someone whose only limitation is an
inability to bathe without assistance might well be thought of as
needing long-term care-at least these standards describe who
needs long-term care. Moreover, the definition focuses on who
needs care rather than where they receive it, which is the more
relevant point. That is, most long-term care insurance policies
pay benefits to insurees who qualify whether they live at home,
with relatives, in an assisted living facility, or in a nursing home,
though the daily benefit amount may be less if they do not live in
an institution.
Unfortunately, a definition of who needs long-term care
does not tell us how many persons need it today, much less how
many of today's sixty year-olds will need it in the future. Of
course, insurance companies must have some notion of the
future demand for long-term care or how could they set the pre-
miums for the policies that they sell? But that knowledge is pro-
prietary, possibly not even very accurate, and pertains to those
who purchase long-term care insurance, not to the universe of
sixty year-olds. For example, those with lower incomes naturally
are under-represented as purchasers of long-term care insurance,
but given what we know about the poorer health of persons with
lower incomes, they are likely over-represented in the population
of those who need long-term care. 6 Nevertheless, the deeper
point is that long-term care can be defined and the demand esti-
mated well enough to support the sale of long-term care
insurance.
For the individual, however, the future need for long-term
care is unknowable. It is an uncertain risk because an individual
has no way of determining the odds of needing long-term care,
nor the length of time it will be needed and not even the daily
cost of such care. With all three of the variables up in the air, so
5. Activities of daily living, or ADLs, are most often defined as the ability
of an individual to eat, bathe, dress, use the toilet, or transfer (get out of a bed
or chair) without assistance. An individual could have an ADL deficit because
of a medical condition such as a stroke, a cognitive deficit such as dementia, or
merely because of extreme frailty. Joshua M. Wiener, et al., U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services, Measuring the Activities of Daily Living: Comparisons
Across National Surveys, reprinted in 45 J. OF GERONTOLOGY S229 (1990).
6. JOHN A. VINCENT ET AL., THE FUTURES OF OLD AGE 50-52 (2006).
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to speak, long-term care is a threat of unknown and unknowable
proportions.
Even though it is an uncertain risk, it nevertheless repre-
sents a very serious financial threat. Currently, nursing home
care can run $5,000 to $10,000 a month.7 Three years in a nurs-
ing home can cost over $170,000. Assisted living costs about one-
half that, but still exceeds the income of many elderly individu-
als.' Home care, which is thought to be a better alternative,
unfortunately can cost even more than a nursing home, particu-
larly if an attendant is available around the clock.9 In contrast,
not all long-term care costs are overwhelming. For example, an
individual might only require care for five months so that even if
the person is in a nursing home, the cost of care would be only
$30,000 to $40,000. And of course some will never need long-
term care and decline and die quickly. Finally, some will need a
great deal of medical care before they die, but if that care is cov-
ered by Medicare, such as when a patient has cancer, Medicare
will pay for almost all of the cost. For example, Mary contracts
cancer and spends the last three months of her life in a hospital.
Her medical care costs $100,000, but Mary has sufficient cover-
age by Medicare to pay for almost all the cost of her hospitaliza-
tion.' ° In contrast, Mark spends the last eighteen months of his
life in a nursing home suffering from dementia. He finally dies
of pneumonia. The cost of the nursing home care was $6,000 a
month, or $108,000 annually. Medicare does not pay for long-
term custodial care, and so Mark has to pay over $100,000 out of
7. AARP Bulletin, Average Daily Cost for Nursing Home Care by State,
2006 (citing Genworth Financial 2006, Cost of Care Survey, Nursing Homes,
Assisted Living Facilities and Home Care Providers, March 2006), available at
http://www.aarp.org/bulletin/longterm/Articles/a2003-10-30-dailycost.html.
8. Therubins.com, The Cost of Assisted Living in Select Areas Across the
United States, http://www.therubins.com/assisted/costof.htm (last visited Mar.
30, 2007).
9. The Federal Long Term Care Insurance Program, How Much Does
Long Term Care Cost?, http://www.ltcfeds.com/start/aboutltccost.html (last
visited Mar. 30, 2007).
10. Medicare pays for the first sixty days of hospitalization less an annual
deductible of $992 in 2007. The next thirty days are also covered by Medicare
with a daily co-pay of $248 in 2007. U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services, Medicare Premiums and Coinsurance Rates for 2007, http://ques-
tions.medicare.gov/cgi-bin/medicare.cfg/php/enduser/std-adp.php?p-faqid=
1847 (last visited Mar. 30, 2007). But if Mary has a Medigap policy, which she
almost certainly does, the policy will pay the daily co-pay for days sixty-one
through ninety. For information on Medigap coverage see LAWRENCE A. FROLIK
& MELISSA C. BROWN, ADVISING THE ELDERLY OR DISABLED CLIENT 13-37 (1992 &
Supp. 2006).
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his pocket. In a sense, Mary was "lucky" to have contracted can-
cer because Medicare paid for almost all of the cost of her care.
So, returning to our 100 representative sixty year-olds, there
they are without a clue as to whether they need long-term care or
how much it might cost them. All they know for certain is that
they face a potential risk that could bankrupt many of them.
When faced with an exceptionally costly, but uncertain
financial risk, the answer is either to self-insure or purchase
insurance. Self-insuring means either assuming that the
extraordinary expense can be paid for out of income, or saving
for the possible cost. Purchasing insurance in this case means
buying long-term care insurance. Let us examine the two
choices.
Preliminarily, it must be acknowledged that a few, but very
few, elderly will be able to pay for all their long-term care costs
solely out of their income. 1 For example, if the individual is age
eighty-nine, single, and has an annual income of $100,000, she
will be able to pay a monthly nursing bill of $7,000, or $84,000 a
year out of her annual income.12 A caveat: twenty years from
now, when our now sixty year-olds needs long-term care, what
will be the monthly cost of a nursing home? Though $7,000 a
month seems high today, it may be a bargain in twenty years if
the cost of long-term care continues to rise. And if our projected
sixty year-old has an annual retirement income of $150,000, it is
unlikely that the income will rise at the same percentage that the
cost of long-term care does. So even high-income sixty year-olds
may find that they cannot pay for all of their long-term care costs
strictly out of income.
In light of the limited income of the elderly, the great major-
ity will need to use their savings to help pay for their long-term
care, particularly if they enter a nursing home. By savings, I refer
to savings accumulated for retirement income purposes such as a
401 (k) account. And by "retirement income" I refer to income
needed for the typical, predictable costs of living: food, shelter,
11. In 2004, for householders with someone age sixty-five or older the
mean income was $38,963 and the median was $25,210. For fiduciary relation-
ship households, the 75th percentile of average income was $46,600. PATRICK
PURCELL & DEBRA B. WHITMAN, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, Topics IN
AGING: INCOME OF AMERICANS AGE 65 AND OLDER, 1969 TO 2004, at 28-29
(2006).
12. I use "she" deliberately because at any age past sixty, there are more
women living than men. So the elderly individual is more likely to be a "she"
than a "he." See Denise Smith, U.S. Census Bureau, The Older Population in
the United States: March 2002, available at http://www.census.gov/prod/
2003pubs/p20-546.pdf.
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entertainment and health care other than long-term care. Sav-
ings for retirement must be spent in a manner that stretches the
spending out over the life of the individual. One way to do this is
to purchase an immediate pay, lifetime annuity with the savings.
The purchase of an annuity is a bet of sorts; a bet by the annui-
tant that she will live longer than her life expectancy. If she
anticipated a premature death, she could spend down the savings
at a rate projected to exhaust the fund in the year of her
expected death. If the individual who needs long-term care has
converted her savings into an annuity, however, her yearly
income may still be insufficient to pay for the costs of the care.
For example, if she uses her $400,000 of savings to buy a lifetime,
fixed annuity that pays $50,000 a year, she will not be able to
afford an annual nursing home expense of $60,000.
Of course, high-income elderly and some not high-income
elderly will have savings, considerable savings in some cases.
These elderly, who may be able to afford the cost of their care by
using their incomes and drawing down their savings, will not
need to take any special pains to save for long-term care costs.
For example, Stephen has annual income of $50,000 and savings
of $300,000. Even if faced with annual long-term care costs of
$70,000 a year, he could pay for his care for fifteen years and if
the cost rose over time to $90,000, he could pay for eight years.
Many more will have some savings but not enough to bear the
cost of lengthy and expensive long-term care. For example,
Susan has income of $40,000 a year and savings of $100,000. She
enters a nursing home that costs $70,000 a year. She has enough
income and savings to pay for about three years of care. Perhaps
that will be enough, perhaps not, but if Susan dies after three
years, she will die penniless.
The number of elderly who are well prepared financially to
pay for long-term care is small and becomes even smaller if they
are married and so must use their income and savings for both
their long-term care and also to support the spouse who is not in
long-term care (the "community spouse" in Medicaid nomencla-
ture). Spending the income and drawing down savings to pay for
long-term care for the spouse in the nursing home can impover-
ish the community spouse. For example, Janet and Jim have an
annual combined income of $60,000 and savings of $300,000
that produces $15,000 a year of their income. Jim enters a nurs-
ing home at an annual cost of $70,000. Janet pays $25,000 of the
cost from their income (leaving her with $35,000) and the
remaining $45,000 from savings. After three years and some
increase in the cost of the nursing home care, Jim dies with
$150,000 having been spent from the savings. Janet now faces
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life with only $150,000 in savings, meaning $7,500 a year less
investment income, and the loss of Jim's Social Security benefit
of $20,000 a year. As a result, her income is reduced to $32,500 a
year. While not impoverished, Janet will certainly not live as well
as she did before Jim entered the nursing home.
Moreover, the community spouse may also need long-term
care someday. But if all the couple's money has been spent on
the first spouse's care, where are the funds to pay for the care of
the second spouse? As we can see, paying for long-term care
costs can be a disaster for married couples. In our example of
Janet and Jim, if after Jim dies, Janet enters a nursing home at a
cost of $70,000 a year, she will have to use about $40,000 a year
from her savings with the result that in about three years she will
be destitute. As demonstrated, income and savings may be
enough to pay for long-term care, but only for a limited time for
most elderly.
In sum, income plus savings (including the value of the
house) that are not converted into an annuity (and many finan-
cial advisors recommend putting half of one's savings into an
annuity) may meet the cost of long-term care, but only if: (1) the
amount of savings is great enough, which means that it far
exceeds the national average; (2) the duration of the need for
long-term care is not too long; and (3) there is no community
spouse dependent on the savings or living in the house. For
many elderly, these conditions will not materialize with the result
that if they need long-term care for any extended period, they
will not be able to afford it.
I have not discussed saving specifically for long-term care
because it makes no sense. No one is going to save, for example,
$200,000 beyond what they save for retirement and not touch it,
not even the income, to protect against the rising cost of long-
term care. To so imagine would be to assume that an elderly
person would accept a lower standard of living just to preserve
assets for possible long-term care costs. Yes, some elderly do not
spend all the income produced by their savings, but they do so
out of fear of outliving their savings or because they want to pass
on a financial legacy to their heirs; not because they are holding
back funds solely to pay long-term care expenses.
For those who cannot afford the cost of long-term care and
who do not have long-term care insurance, the national solution
is Medicaid, the federal-state subsidy for the cost of nursing
homes. 3 Medicaid is a need based program.14 To be eligible for
13. FROLIK & BROWN, supra note 10, at 10-12 (1992).
14. Id. at 10-3
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Medicaid, the individual must exhaust her savings and apply
essentially all of her income to paying for the cost of her nursing
home.15 For married couples, some provision is made for reserv-
ing income and savings for the community spouse, but again, the
intent is to squeeze out as much of the payments as possible from
the savings and income of the couple with the result that many
community spouses face a sharp reduction in their quality of
life.1
6
If income or savings are not sufficient to pay for long-term
care, the apparent alternative to personal impoverishment in
order to qualify for Medicaid is to purchase long-term care insur-
ance. Or is it?
The universal rule as to insurance is to buy it to protect
against an unacceptable risk of loss. 7 Does the cost of long-term
care fit that model? Yes and no. Long-term care costs can be an
unacceptable risk if the loss of income and savings to pay those
costs is considered an unacceptable risk, which it can be. But
merely because long-term care costs can be very high, even to the
point of impoverishing the individual, does not prove that such
costs pose an unacceptable risk. Even the risk of impoverish-
ment can be an acceptable risk if it does not result in a diminu-
tion in the quality of the individual's life, and if the individual
can accept dying with no estate. And Medicaid payment of nurs-
ing home costs fits that paradigm. Recipients of Medicaid who
reside in a nursing home receive care that is indistinguishable
from that received by all but a few residents who pay a premium
for care that exceeds what Medicaid will pay for. Most private
pay nursing home residents receive care that is the same as what
is provided for Medicaid recipients. Whether an individual is
willing to exhaust her estate in order to qualify for Medicaid is
less certain. For some, dying without leaving an estate to chil-
dren or others would be unacceptable. For others, it is an
unpleasant but acceptable risk in light of the cost of the alterna-
tive: long-term care insurance.
Initially it should be observed that long-term care insurance
is more like fire insurance on a home than like life insurance,
because like fire damage on a home, the need for long-term care
is not sure to occur. It is perhaps more likely than a home fire,
15. Id. at 10-8 to 10-9.
16. The community spouse is entitled a spousal resource allowance of no
more than $101,640 of assets (in 2007) plus exempt assets such as the house
and a car, and a monthly Minimum Maintenance Needs Allowance of at least
$1,650 (as of July 1, 2006). Id. at 10-10 to 10-11.
17. Cf EMMETJ. VAUGHAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF RISK AND INSURANCE 21 (4th
ed. 1986) (describing insurance as "the most formal" way of dealing with risk).
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but unlike death, not 100 percent. So, the first question is how
high is the risk of long-term care for the individual contemplat-
ing its purchase? Next, how much care or howlong will the care
be needed? For example, assuming that seventy percent of
today's sixty year-olds will someday need long-term care (an arbi-
trary but plausible percentage), we must ask how many will need
it for more than a year? Then we must ask how much will the
long-term care cost? We know long-term care comes in many
forms, from modest assistance in the home, to adult day care, to
assisted living, and finally nursing home care. So even if the risk
is twenty percent for needing care for at least eighteen months,
the cost of that care may average only $50,000 because most of it
will not occur in a nursing home. Imagine for example, Jenna,
who at age eighty-five must leave her apartment and move into
assisted living because of mild dementia. She spends a year in
assisted living at a cost of $35,000. Her health declines, and so
she moves into a nursing home at an annual cost of $70,000.
After a year, she dies. The total cost of her long-term care is
$105,000. Costly, but not overwhelmingly so.
Suppose, however, that ten percent of our sixty year-olds will
need long-term care for two years or longer at a total median cost
(not mean) of $200,000, with five percent facing lifetime long-
term care costs in excess of $300,000 (such as five years of care at
an average rate of $60,000 per year), and two percent incurring
costs of at least $500,000. While these dollar amounts appear to
be "unacceptable risks," they are not necessarily unacceptable
except in context.
For a single individual (or a surviving spouse), long-term
care costs exceeding as much as $300,000 are only unacceptable
if she wants to protect the value of her estate. Otherwise even
spending $500,000 has no deleterious effect. For example, imag-
ine Gail, a ninety year old widow with assets and a house worth
$400,000, plus annual income of $40,000. If she moves into a
nursing home that costs $8,000 a month, or $96,000 a year, she
has income and assets sufficient to pay for at least seven years.
That is, she will spend all of her annual income, plus $56,000 a
year from her savings, which will last for about seven years. If she
dies after seven years, her estate will be almost completely
depleted, but she will not have suffered; only her potential heirs
will be out significant sums.
Suppose Gail has only $200,000 in savings and annual
income of $20,000. If she incurs annual nursing home costs of
$96,000, she will exhaust her funds in about two and a half years.
The response is, "So what?" Having impoverished herself, she
will be eligible for Medicaid. If she lives in a nursing home for
2007]
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another five, six, or even ten years, it makes no difference, as
Medicaid will pay for the same level and quality of care that she
received as a private pay individual. Yes, her estate will be
reduced to zero value and her heirs will receive nothing, but her
need for long-term care will be met. True, if she had the funds,
she might have purchased care in a nursing home that offers
somewhat better care than that paid for by Medicaid, such as hav-
ing a private room. But only a very small percentage of the eld-
erly in nursing homes, even though they are private pay residents
(at least until their funds are exhausted), receive care that differs
in any way from what residents receive who are on Medicaid."8
Because Medicaid provides the same quality of care for most
recipients that they would have purchased with their own funds,
they have little incentive to avoid using Medicaid as the source of
payment for their long-term care. The most compelling incen-
tive for avoiding Medicaid is the need of the community spouse,
who will almost always suffer economically if the institutionalized
spouse (the Medicaid term for the spouse in the nursing home)
is on Medicaid. Although the community spouse will be permit-
ted to keep all her income from her pensions and Social Secur-
ity, she will no longer have the income of the institutionalized
spouse to help support the household, unless she qualifies for
additional income from the institutionalized spouse as part of
the Minimum Monthly Maintenance Needs Allowance."9 But
that additional income ceases at the death of the institutional-
ized.2" A married couple's purchase of a couple of long-term
care insurance that would cover both of them could provide
additional income that would delay or avoid having the institu-
tionalized spouse go on Medicaid to pay for nursing home
expenses. The benefits paid by the insurance would protect the
income of the community spouse as well as the couple's assets,
thereby helping to financially protect the community spouse.
The other reason to avoid the need for Medicaid by purchas-
ing long-term care insurance is to protect the value of the estate
of the individual or the couple. That is, insurance protects the
savings from depletion. Even if Medicaid is never going to be
needed because the income and savings are adequate to pay for
the care, long-term care insurance will insure that the estate will
suffer less or no shrinkage on account of paying for long-term
care.
18. Because of the need to qualify for Medicaid, almost all nursing homes
provide care that meets the Medicaid standard such as two residents per room.
19. FROLIK & BROWN, supra note 10, at 10-20 to 10-22.
20. Id.
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Of course, the degree of protection of the community
spouse and the estate depends on the amount of insurance bene-
fits. For example, if the daily benefit of the insurance is $150 for
five years, the maximum benefit equals $54,750 per year, or
$273,750 for five years.21 A lot of money to be sure, but not an
exceptional amount in terms of estate protection, as it is likely
less than the value of the individual's house. If the insurance
benefit was not time limited, it could be a larger amount, but
that assumes that the insured individual buys long-term care
insurance that pays benefits for more than five years. Still, even if
we assume that the benefits are not time limited and are paid for
eight years, the total benefits would be $438,000. If the daily ben-
efit is raised to $200 the numbers are not that much different: an
annual benefit of $73,000 or five years' worth of benefits of
$365,000-still not an overwhelming sum. For eight years the
total is $584,000, an impressive amount, but one that is unlikely
ever to be paid given how few elderly would qualify for eight
years of long-term care insurance benefits.
The question is whether the advantages of long-term care
insurance are sufficiently appealing to induce our mythical
group of sixty year-olds to buy it. To date, the answer appears to
be no, as only a small percentage of the elderly own long-term
care insurance. 22 For many, the advantages are not compelling.
For single elderly individuals, the need to protect a spouse is
absent. For couples, the desire to protect an estate may be lack-
ing or they may simply not see the reason to bear the cost of the
premiums to buy insurance that will not benefit them but only
their heirs. Most are not aware of the potential financial disaster
that can befall a community spouse, and so do not realize the
value of long-term care insurance in terms of protection of the
community spouse.
Some single persons purchase long-term care insurance
because they fear that Medicaid may not be available in the
future when they need it or they wish to be able to purchase bet-
ter care than that provided by Medicaid. Some may buy long-
term care insurance because they want the benefits in the event
they need assisted living. Modern long-term care insurance poli-
cies pay the same benefit whether the individual lives in an
21. This ignores inflation adjustments because present value is used to
make the comparison. Future projected inflated dollar amounts would make
the same point.
22. The total number of individual policies appears to be fewer than six
million. See Insurance Information Institute, Facts and Statistics: Long-Term Care
Insurance, http://www.iii.org/media/facts/statsbyissue/longtermcare (last vis-
ited March 30, 2007).
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assisted living facility or nursing home, assuming the individual
otherwise qualifies for the benefits. Because assisted living costs
about half of what is charged by nursing homes, long-term care
insurance benefits combined with the individual's savings and
income, may permit a single individual to stay in an assisted liv-
ing facility until death. Without the long-term care insurance
benefits, the individual might exhaust her savings and, lacking
enough income to pay for assisted living, she would have to move
into a nursing home because Medicaid will not pay for long-term
care delivered in an assisted living facility. Of course, that could
change; Medicaid might become liberal in what it will pay for,
but that is not the case today and may never be the case. Long-
term care insurance benefits give the insured the comfort that
the insured will have more choices as to where to receive long-
term care.
Other single individuals and couples buy long-term care
insurance because it now typically pays for home health care ben-
efits, albeit often at one-half the daily rate of the benefits paid if
the insured is in an institution. The insurance is sold as a means
of staying in one's house rather than moving to an assisted living
facility or a nursing home. Interestingly, purchasing long-term
care insurance for its home health care benefits is probably the
least compelling reason to do so because the reduced benefit
amount is very unlikely to be sufficient to purchase care in the
home for any length of time. For example, if the policy pays a
benefit of $150 a day for an institutionalized insured, the home
health care benefit would be $75 a day. To qualify for the bene-
fit, the insured will have to submit documentation of a medical
need for care, deficits in two activities of daily living, or have sig-
nificant cognitive impairment. If any of these three conditions
prevail, the individual will need a good deal of assistance in order
to remain at home. And the policy may require a showing that
care is being provided by non-family members in order to trigger
the payment of benefits. It is difficult to imagine that $75 a day
would be enough to meet the cost of the needed care. Yes, it
would be a base that could be supplemented by income or sav-
ings, but $75 a day is only $2,250 a month and $27,000 annually,
which is hardly a sum that in most cases would be a tipping point
as to whether the individual could stay at home. Yet, despite
these limitations, benefits paid for home health care are an
attractive feature in the eyes of many purchasers of the
insurance.
Even if buying long-term care insurance can be a rational
and effective response to a significant financial risk, those for
whom it would be a wise choice nevertheless often do not
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purchase it. Why? It seems that the underlying reasons for the
relatively low sales of long-term care insurance are cost, igno-
rance, and blind hope that it will never be needed. These reasons
are intertwined in ways that reinforce each other.
The younger the age at which the policy is commenced, the
lower the premium. However, selling long-term care insurance
to, for example, a fifty year old, is difficult. I have a single friend
who purchased long-term care insurance at age forty-five, but she
teaches elder law and is acutely aware of why she might want
long-term care insurance. She is the rare exception. Most of us
do not even imagine a need for long-term care, much less insur-
ance, until we are in our sixties or, more likely, our seventies.
Even though most of us will have been alerted to the cost and
possibility of long-term care by the experiences of our parents
and other older relatives, we still refuse to admit that some day
we too may be a demented resident of a nursing home. It is just
too painful to contemplate.23 Just as a life insurance agent knows
that it is difficult to focus a potential customer on the possibility
of his or her own death despite it being an absolute certainty, it is
even more difficult to persuade a healthy sixty-five year-old to buy
insurance to pay for the much less than certain need for long-
term care. In short, individuals find it difficult to purchase long-
term care insurance at an age when it is affordable in part
because it is easy to ignore an uncertain and unpleasant risk.
Not surprisingly, even someone who rationally considers the
need for long-term care insurance might decide not to purchase
it largely because she underestimated the need for it or underval-
ued it. That is, a childless sixty year-old single woman might not
be aware of her very long life expectancy or not understand that
if she is single and childless she has a higher probability of resid-
ing in a nursing home. Likewise, even if a seventy year old single
male understands the risk, he might well conclude that the
annual cost of long-term care insurance is just too high in light of
his limited income.
Other factors also inhibit the sale of long-term care insur-
ance. The paradox is that the risk of long-term care costs
increases with age, while the ability to purchase the insurance
declines with age. As the premiums increase with age and the
ability to qualify decreases, the probability of letting a policy
lapse increase. It is interesting to note that premiums do not rise
after the policy is purchased merely because the insured ages.
Premiums can and do increase, but only as a general increase for
23. See Elisabeth Belmont et al., A Guide to Legal Issues in Life-Limiting Con-
ditions, 38J. OF HEALTH L. 145, 149 (2005).
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all policy holders. Initial annual premiums do notjust grow actu-
arially to reflect the fewer years of anticipated premium pay-
ments, but also to account for adverse selection factors.
As individuals age, those who suspect that they will have
long-term care costs will be disproportionate purchasers of long-
term care insurance and their suspicions will be statistically accu-
rate. Individuals with poorer health, who lack a spouse, or who
observe older siblings with long-term care needs are more likely
to purchase insurance than healthy, married individuals whose
family history does not suggest a higher risk of long-term care.
Premiums also rise faster than age because the insurer takes on
more risk the fewer years it can expect to collect premiums from
the insured. For example, if Acme Insurance Company sells
long-term care insurance policies only to those age sixty-five to
seventy or younger, it can expect on the average to collect premi-
ums for fifteen to twenty years, the average life expectancy for
that age group. Beta Insurance Company, in contrast, only sells
policies to those aged eighty to eighty-five. Its average premium
collection period will be eight to twelve years. Naturally Beta will
charge higher premiums to reflect the fewer years that it expects
to collect them, but it also must charge more for two additional
risks.
First, if Beta has under-calculated the total benefit payments
paid by the policies, it will have to raise the premium for the
entire class of beneficiaries, because the policy will prohibit a rise
in premium merely because the insured is older. But Beta will
have fewer years to correct the initial miscalculation and collect
sufficient premiums to make up the unanticipated shortfall.
Acme, in contrast, has more years to collect higher premiums to
correct for an initial under-pricing of the product.
Second, premiums are not the only source of benefit pay-
ments. Insurance companies invest premiums, and the income
earned on the premiums is a significant source of benefit pay-
ments. Naturally, in our example, Beta knew when it sold poli-
cies to older purchasers that it had fewer years to invest the
premiums, and so earnings on those premiums would supply a
smaller percentage of the benefits than they would in Acme's
case. Beta also knows that in addition to having fewer years, it
has less opportunity to have its premium investments recover
from low or even negative earnings. If Acme makes a poor
investment or gets caught in a down stock market, its investments
have more time to recover, thus it has less risk. The higher
investment risk faced by Beta can only be offset by higher
premiums.
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The older the individual, the less likely he or she will be able
to qualify for long-term care insurance because of health
problems. Unfortunately, the very health problems that may
make individuals uninsurable also alert them to the wisdom of
purchasing long-term care insurance. For couples, the decline of
one spouse may alert them to the need for long-term care insur-
ance, but if the ill spouse is too impaired or sick, the couple
might not qualify as purchasers. However, in most cases, the trig-
gering cause will not disqualify the couple from insurance but
only serve to motivate them to purchase it. At any age, individu-
als with poorer health are more likely to purchase long-term care
insurance than their healthier compatriots. Those with declin-
ing health who buy insurance drive up the cost of the premiums
because their poorer health leads both to an acceleration of ben-
efit payments and to more benefits being paid per policy sold.
Finally, the longer the insured lives, the more likely he is to
let the policy lapse. The percentage of lapsed long-term care
insurance policies is the little secret that insurance companies
carefully guard. From the point of view of the insurance com-
pany, a lapsed policy is a "good" policy. Ideally the policy would
lapse just before the insured qualified for benefits under the pol-
icy. Next best is an insured who pays premiums for a number of
years and then lets the policy lapse. Coming in last, but still good
for the insurance company (or at least the agent who sold the
policy), is the insured who lets the policy lapse after two or three
years. While lapsed policies are good for the insurance company,
they represent a financial loss to the insured-not a complete
loss because the insured did have the advantage of the insurance
coverage for some period of time, but a loss because the risk of
long-term care costs rises with age. Thus, the value to the
insured of a long-term care insurance policy value rises with
advancing age, even though the premiums do not. Allowing the
policy to lapse means that the insured has "overpaid" for the
period of covered risk.
Why do individuals allow policies to lapse? Cost is the main
reason. Premiums can rise over time. What may have seemed
like a relative bargain at age sixty may seem like an unnecessary
and too costly expense at age eighty-five. While the premiums
are likely to rise, the income of the insured is probably not rising
at the same percentage, meaning that the premiums represent a
greater relative cost to the insured. Many individuals become
very cautious about their expenses as they age. Faced with a
fixed income and rising expenses for food, housing, and medical
expenses, many older individuals begin to cut back on their liv-
ing expenses, particularly reoccurring expenses. A quarterly
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long-term care insurance premium may seem a burden that is
not worth the cost because it may not provide actual benefit.
Other elderly, who suffer from a decline in mental capacity, may
fail to appreciate the importance of the insurance and focus only
on its cost with the result that they stop paying the premiums. A
few become too incapacitated to even realize that they are letting
the policy lapse.
Faced with these and other impediments to the sale and
continuation of long-term care insurance, it is hardly surprising
that the product has such a low rate of market penetration. Even
if sales increase dramatically, however, long-term care insurance
is not likely to be a solution or even a significant source of fund-
ing for long-term care. Unless a large percentage of the elderly
purchase it, long-term care insurance will remain a minor source
of funding for long-term care and, in particular, for nursing
home care.
If insurance is not the answer to a payment source for long-
term care, the income and savings of those in need of long-term
care are the initial source of payment. When those funds are
exhausted, only two other sources are available. First, the chil-
dren or other descendants of the person in need, and second the
government.
Although there is some support for forcing children to pay
for the long-term care of their parents, that support is tepid and
often totally disappears when confronted with reality. It is easy to
picture a very well-to-do child and a parent impoverished by the
costs of long-term care. Requiring that child to pay for the care
of the parent does not seem unreasonable. But that picture has
little to do with reality. If a $60,000 annual nursing home
expense has impoverished the parent, it will also soon impover-
ish most adult children. If we do not want to impoverish the
child, how many assets or how much income do we permit the
child to retain? Should a child be permitted to retain savings for
his child's education? Must a child sell or mortgage real prop-
erty to pay for a parent's care? Which children should be
required to pay? A state has jurisdiction only over those in the
state. If the parent lives in Indiana and the child in Arizona, the
state has no way to collect from the child. If there are two or
more children, should the obligation to pay for the parent be
only on the child who lives in the state of the parent? Even if the
state has jurisdiction over all the children, which children should
be expected to pay? Should the burden be assigned in propor-
tion to the income and wealth of the child? What if the assets of
the child are in the name of the spouse? Surely, we are not going
to force a son- or daughter-in-law to support a father- or mother-
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in-law? What of children who were "abandoned" by a non-custo-
dial parent who did not pay court mandated child care? Do we
think that the child is now responsible for the long-term care
expenses of the parent who did not meet his obligation? For
these and many other compelling reasons, states have long since
abandoned any expectation that children should be compelled
to bear the costs of their parents' long-term care.
As for government bearing the cost of long-term care, that is
the world we live in, though it is not a world that many of us
would have designed. This is not the place to offer an extended
critique of Medicaid, which pays for over forty percent of the cost
of nursing home care. Suffice it to say, the program as currently
constituted appears to be unsustainable. First, because states col-
lectively pay for about half the cost of Medicaid, they are under
great financial pressure to reduce its cost. States have responded
in a variety of ways to reduce or at least limit the growth in the
cost of the program including urging the federal government to
restrict eligibility and force beneficiaries to expend more of their
assets before they qualify for Medicaid reimbursement of their
nursing home expenses. More state resistance can be expected
in the years to come, with additional efforts by Congress to limit
eligibility by, among other ways, attacking Medicaid eligibility
planning techniques.
Limitations on Medicaid eligibility do not create a source of
payment for long-term care. They merely create greater impov-
erishment of those in need of long-term care and their families.
What is needed is a fresh source of funding for long-term care.
The answer is to compel the public to save for the possible need
for long-term care through mandatory long-term care insurance.
While insurance is not normally thought of as a form of savings,
when viewed in the aggregate, it is. For example, return to our
imaginary group of 100 individuals, all age sixty. Now assume
that they create ajoint long-term care insurance fund. Actuaries
calculate what level of premiums are necessary to sustain up to
five years of benefits for each one of the group who may need
long-term care, however that is defined. Each of the group pays
into the insurance fund, which in turn is invested and held until
needed to pay benefits. Collectively the group will have saved
enough over their respective lifetimes to pay for the cost of their
long-term care. Of course, some of the group will not need long-
term care and hence, they will never collect benefits. For them,
the cost of the premiums will be an expense rather than a form
of savings. But for the group, the premiums represent savings
held and invested to meet an actuarially predictable need-pay-
ment for the costs of long-term care.
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The earlier the age at which the group begins to pay premi-
ums, the smaller the premium must be because of the more years
it is paid and, more importantly, the more the investment
return.24 To overcome the reluctance of individuals to purchase
long-term care insurance necessitates that it be mandated. All
contribute and all are potential beneficiaries.
Federally mandated long-term care insurance could be paid
for by a tax on wages (or income for those with no wages) with a
subsidy of the premium for those with very low incomes. The
premiums could begin at age forty or perhaps fifty. The earlier
the payment, the smaller the annual premium. The payment of
the premiums could continue for an individual's life or they
could be stepped down with advancing age or terminated upon
retirement or an arbitrary age, such as eighty. Benefits would be
paid based upon standards similar to current long-term care
insurance, such as deficits in activities of daily living, significant
cognitive impairment, or a medical need for such care. The pre-
miums would be invested in order to reduce the cost of the insur-
ance. Individuals could purchase additional long-term care
insurance if they thought the benefits paid by the government
mandated insurance were inadequate. Medicaid would continue
to pay for nursing home care for those for whom the mandated
insurance was inadequate, even when supplemented by their
income or savings, or those who had exhausted their benefits.
The advantages of mandatory long-term care insurance are
obvious. It would create a pool of funds from which to pay for
much of the future long-term care costs. It would create national
savings to meet a national expense. How much it would pay for
each individual would depend upon the amount of the benefits,
and that in turn would depend upon how high were the premi-
ums. The rich, the middle class, and the poor would all benefit.
The rich, who might be able to pay for their long-term care,
would receive benefits that would increase the size of their
estates or permit them to purchase better care. The middle class
would be better able to preserve assets for their heirs and provide
for a more comfortable life for a community spouse. In contrast
to Medicaid, which only pays for nursing homes, mandated long-
term care insurance benefits would also pay for assisted living
and possibly home health care, thus providing the poor with
funds to purchase long-term care in a variety of settings, and
often at a lower price. And if the premiums of those with limited
income were subsidized, they would have received even greater
24. The risk of paying benefits also increases slightly, but not in propor-
tion to the greater investment return.
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value from the insurance. Those of any economic class, who
died after only modest or even no long-term care expenses,
would have received the value of the insurance coverage in the
same way that fire insurance has value even if the house never
has a fire. In short, all economic segments of society would bene-
fit from mandatory long-term care insurance.
The costs of long-term care must be borne by someone.
Why not by all of us through an insurance arrangement? By col-
lective action, we can meet the need of the individual to pay for
long-term care and thus reduce by a bit our being "exposed to
every risk and hardship.""
25. JANE AUSTEN, PERSUASION 254 (Janet Todd & Antje Blank eds., Cam-
bridge Univ. Press 2006) (1818).
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